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COMMENTS
accordance with a marital settlement her tax basis is the fair
market value of the property at the time she acquired it. In the
area of income tax liability the only unresolved area of the law
is the income tax consequences to the husband of property set-
tlements involving property that has increased in value from the
time of its acquisition. The pending decision in the Davis case
could settle the hiatus in this area. However, it is submitted
that congressional action will be required to alleviate the present
tax void in antenuptial property settlements.
D. Mark Bienvenu
Damages For Pain And Suffering - - The Propriety Of
Per Diem Arguments
It is now generally recognized that pain and suffering are
proper elements to be considered in determining damages in a
personal injury suit.' When attempting to award these damages
the difficult problem of determining what is a fair and adequate
award immediately presents itself. There is no way to evaluate
the losses caused solely by pain and suffering in monetary terms
owing to the impossibility of making a third person exactly
aware of the extent and nature of this damage. In recognition
of this fact, it has been stated that the enlightened conscience
of the jury is the only permissible guide, 2 and that the ultimate
test is that of the reasonableness of the award.3 But in actuality,
the standard of reasonableness is of only limited assistance to
a juror attempting to arrive at a proper award. He is still left
relatively uninformed and may be skeptical of his ability to cor-
1. Physical pain and suffering: Lacy v. Lucky, 19 La. App. 743, 140 So. 857
(1932) ; Nevala v. City of Ironwood, 232 Mich. 316, 205 N.W. 93 (1925) ; Nash-
ville v. Brown, 25 Tenn. App. 340, 157 S.W.2d 612 (1942). Mental pain and
suffering: Crawford v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Ins. Co., 42 So.2d
553 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949) ; Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643,
86 N.E.2d 306 (1949). Future pain and suffering: Shuck v. Keefe, 205 Iowa
375, 218 N.W. 31 (1928) ; City of Richmond v. Hill, 195 Ky. 566, 242 S.W. 867
(1922).
2. See Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 80 So.2d 662, 667 (Fla. 1955).
In states such as Louisiana where juries are seldom used in civil cases, the judge
will of course serve the same function as the jury normally would if used. How-
ever, this Note deals primarily with the damage problem as it concerns the jury.
The problem in Louisiana is dealt with in note 17 infra.
3. See Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 80 So.2d 662, 666 (Fla. 1955)
Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Mo. 1959); Affett v. Milwaukee &
Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis.2d 604, 609, 106 N.W.2d 274, 277 (1960).
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relate pain and suffering with a reasonable monetary figure.
Where the juror is unsure of himself, he may be amenable to
suggestions and arguments as to quantum advanced by counsel.
This situation invites trial lawyers to put great emphasis on
argumentative skill, and has led to the development of new
methods of presenting to the jury the question of damages for
pain and suffering.
Lately a somewhat controversial method of presenting dam-
age arguments to the jury has been used in several jurisdictions.
This method consists of determining damages on a limited time
basis with an award for each period being suggested by counsel. 4
The estimated length of time which the plaintiff has suffered or
is expected to suffer is broken down into days or even into
hours, minutes, or seconds. By means of simple multiplication
a final tabulation is obtained. Thus if the suggested rate of re-
covery is one dollar per hour and the condition is expected to
continue unabated for five years, the total amount would be
computed by determining the number of hours in five years and
assigning one dollar for each to arrive at the total damage fig-
ure, $43,800.00. The propriety of such arguments by counsel has
provoked much controversy. However, before examining the
pros and cons of the question, the nature of pain and suffering
and the desirability of allowing such damage at all should be
considered.
It has been suggested that damages given for pain and suf-
fering are punitive rather than compensatory in nature.5 If this
were true, any reference to them, in per diem arguments or
otherwise, would be improper in states such as Louisiana where
4. Mr. Melvin Belli, an advocate of per diem arguments, explains the necessity
of them as follows: "You must break up the thirty years life expectancy into
finite detailed periods of time. You must take these small periods of time, seconds
and minutes and determine in dollars and cents what each period is worth. You
must start with the seconds and minutes rather than at the other end of thirty
years. You cannot stand in front of a jury and say, 'Here is a man horribly in-jured, permanently disabled, who will suffer excruciating pain for the rest of his
life, he is entitled to a verdict of $225,000.'
"You must start at the beginning and show that pain is a continuous thing,
second by second, minute by minute, hour by hour, year after year for thirty
years. You must interpret one second, one minute, one hour, one year of pain and
suffering into dollars and cents and then multiply to your absolute figure to show
how you have achieved your result on an award approaching adequacy at $225,000.
If you throw a novel figure at a jury or an appellate court of $225,000, without
breaking it down, you are going to frighten both your trier of facts and your
reviewer of facts." BErLr, THE USE OF DEMONSTRATIvE EVIDENCE IN ACHIEVING
THE MORE ADEQUATE AWARD 33-34 (1951).
5. Plant, Damagea for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200, 206 (1958).
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punitive damages are not recognized.0 According to the more
generally accepted doctrine, punitive damages are primarily for
the purpose of punishing a wrongdoer. 7 In comparison, com-
pensatory damages are those awarded as compensation, indem-
nity, or restitution for harm sustained.8 The primary notion is
that of repairing the plaintiff's injury or of making him as near-
ly whole as a monetary award will permit.9 Compensatory dam-
ages are designed to afford indemnity to an injured party for
that which he has actually suffered or is likely to suffer, rather
than to castigate a tortfeasor for his conduct. Hence, it appears
that pain and suffering damage awards can be justified only on
the ground that they are compensatory.
As the presently accepted theory underlying tort damages is
based upon the proposition of making the injured party whole,
it clearly seems that pain and suffering must be considered as
an element in determining the quantum of an award for dam-
ages. Undoubtedly the plaintiff who has suffered pain at the
hands of the defendant tortfeasor has lost his right to freedom
from physical and mental suffering. Of course, such an injury
is not as easily discernible as one manifested by obvious physical
symptoms, but it is nonetheless present and often of much more
serious consequences. Perhaps the real reason for opposition to
pain and suffering damages is the administrative problems in-
volved -the impossibility of accurately correlating pain and
suffering with an exact money value and the possibility of fab-
ricated claims. Despite these problems, tort law is rapidly ex-
panding to provide recovery for injuries once thought too specu-
lative to be considered by a court of law, including those which
pose difficult problems of evaluation and administration.
Awarding damages in such nebulous areas as pain and suffering
is expressive of the trend of modern law toward recognizing the
more subtle aspects of personal injuries, despite the problems
presented. 10 Thus it appears that pain and suffering will and
should be a basis for recovery.
6. In Louisiana the right of recovery in actions for personal injury is limited
to actual and compensatory damages affording ;adequate indemnity for injury,
and does not extend to punitive damages. Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43
So.2d 599 (1949) ; Burt v. Shreveport Ry., 142 La. 308, 76 So. 723 (1917).
7. Barnes v. Lehman, 118 Colo. 161, 193 P.2d 273 (1948); Margaret Ann
Super Markets, Inc. v. Dent, 64 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1953) ; Davenport v. Wvoodside
Cotton Mills Co., 225 S.C. 52, 80 S.E.2d 740 (1954).
8. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 903 (1934).
9. Kalven, The Jury, The Law and Personal Injury Damage Awards, 19
01o ST. L.J. 158, 160 (1958).
10. As an example of the expanding scope of tort law, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS
II, TENTATIVE DRAFT I, § 46 (1957).
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In some jurisdictions counsel are permitted to suggest a total
lump sum award for pain and suffering." Not only may an
award be suggested, but it is also proper to attempt to convince
the jury that the proposed figure is desirable under the circum-
stances of the case. It seem that such suggestions have some ef-
fect upon the jury in reaching a final decision as to the proper
quantum of damages. The juror has likely devoted little time
to the consideration of damages, and could be expected to have
in mind only some vague generalities as to a maximum and min-
imum award. It would seem that at this point a persuasive at-
torney could greatly influence the ultimate decision by arguing
the appropriateness of a suggested lump sum award. However,
the opposite effect might be reached where the award suggested
is far in excess of anything which could be considered as reason-
able by a juror. If counsel attempts to convince the jury of the
reasonableness of a completely unrealistic figure, this fact might
be detected and lead to a general distrust of his position.
Just as a lump sum suggestion by counsel may influence the
jury, the use of per diem arguments seemingly accomplishes the
same result. However, when dealing with per diem arguments
the danger of undue influence on the jury is greater than where
only lump sum arguments are permitted. This is because per
diem arguments are deceptive in that they give the jury a sensa-
tion of mathematically computing damages when such damages
are not mathematically computable at all. Even though a per
diem figure is as likely to be inappropriate as that suggested by
a lump sum argument, the mathematical computations by coun-
sel give the total sum an aura of calculability which it does not
necessarily deserve. Also, what seems to be reasonable when
suggested for pain and suffering for one hour may not lead to
reasonable results when multiplied out for several years. But
when the final tabulation is obtained and a total result present-
ed, the jury is confronted with the idea that the original choice
was good and from there on it was just a matter of computation.
There seems to be the possibility that in such a situation the
juror will not go back and weigh the suggested figure used as a
base, but will assume its validity in the face of a maze of com-
putations. Thus it seems that there is the danger that when a
juror sees or hears computations based on an arbitrary per diem
11. See Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 300 Ky. 817, 190 S.W.2d 562 (1945);.
Sanders v. Boston & M. R.R., 77 N.H. 381, 92 Atl. 546 (1914) ; Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Herman, 295 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
[Vol. XXII
COMMENTS
figure he will be influenced to give the result more weight than
it deserves.
In some jurisdictions per diem arguments have been con-
demned on the basis of various refinements of the general prop-
osition that closing arguments are to be confined to that which
may be properly inferred from the evidence. 12 As an example,
one criticism advanced by the courts against per diem arguments
is that their use presents counsel with an opportunity to instill
in the minds of jurors impressions not founded on evidence.' 8
Another theory is that following the presentation of per diem
arguments by plaintiff, a defendant is prejudiced by being
placed in a position of attempting to rebut an argument having
no basis in the evidence.' 4 It seems that these objections to the
use of per diem arguments are justified, but are perhaps equally
applicable to lump sum suggestions. Rejecting the per diem ap-
proach on the basis of such reasoning would lead to an obvious
inconsistency in jurisdictions where lump sum arguments are
permitted. 5 The reason for excluding per diem arguments is to
be found in the idea that they have a more harmful effect by
bestowing upon the plaintiff more of an advantage than does the
lump sum argument. It appears that, at least in jurisdictions
where lump sum arguments are permitted, it would be more
realistic to exclude per diem arguments simply because there is
a greater possibility that they will unduly confuse the jury with-
out furnishing a better guide to offset this increased risk of
confusion.
It is submitted that a solution to the problem of damages for
pain and suffering cannot be obtained simply by breaking the
period of suffering into time periods and assigning a value to
each. Due to the subjective nature of pain and suffering, corre-
lation with an exact money value is an impossible task, no mat-
ter how small the period under consideration might be.'6 The
12 Haynes v. Coleman, 338 Mich. 371, 61 N.W.2d 634 (1953).
13. See Henne v. Balick, 146 A.2d 394, 398 (Del. 1958) ; Affett v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis.2d 604, 613, 106 N.W.2d 274, 280 (1960).
14. See a discussion of the various criticisms of per diem arguments in Ratner
v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82, 88-89 (Fla. App. 1959).
15. In Wisconsin lump sum arguments are permitted but per diem arguments
are excluded. See Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis.2d
604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960). In that case the court condemned per diem argu-
ments because their use presents counsel with an opportunity to instill in the
minds of jurors impressions not founded on evidence. The court then went on to
say that lump sum arguments were permissible, apparently not realizing the in-
consistency of reasoning expounded.
16. There is no exact correspondence between money and physical or mental
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vast imponderable is still present whether the problem be viewed
by seconds, days, or years. Thus a policy objection to the per
diem approach is that it is essentially a trial tactic, which con-
fuses the jury, and at the same time does nothing to assist in
the solution of the actual problem. It is therefore suggested that
per diem arguments should not be permitted when the quantum
for pain and suffering damage is at issue. 17
Walter M. Hunter, Jr.
Liability In Left Turn Collisions'
Louisiana courts are frequently called upon to decide the
issue of liability for damages arising out of automobile collisions
where, at the moment of impact, one of the parties was attempt-
ing to turn to his left. In this Comment, it is sought to derive
the prevailing attitudes of the Louisiana appellate courts con-
cerning what constitutes negligence on the part of the motorist
turning to his left, what constitutes negligence on the part of the
non-turning motorist involved in a left turn collision, and the
interrelationships of their two patterns of conduct in deciding
the issue of liability.
injury or suffering, and the various factors involved are not capable of proof
in dollars and cents. For this reason, the only standard for evaluation is such
amount as reasonable persons estimate to be fair compensation. Botta v. Brunner,
26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
17. As juries are seldom used in Louisiana civil cases, the damage problem
will usually be handled by a judge. Due to the experience of trial judges, per
diem arguments are not as likely to influence their decisions as they would a
juror's. However, it seems that per diem arguments should still be condemned
in Louisiana for the same reasons mentioned in the text. If for no other reason,
such tactics should not be permitted as they do nothing to assist in the solution
of the damage issue, and serve only to delay the trial.
1. As used by the Louisiana courts, the term "left turn" incorporates a va-
riety of maneuvers, in all of which a motorist changes course more or less to his
left. The term is most commonly applied where a motorist turns across the oppo-
site lane of traffic in order to enter an intersecting street or a private drive. How-
ever, the courts also characterize as a left turn such maneuvers as turning onto
a street from a private drive or parking lot with intention to travel in the far
lane. Zurich Fire Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 49 So.2d 460 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
The motorist who turns left across the neutral ground of a boulevard and stops
before crossing the opposite lane is considered to be turning left after having
stopped, even though after stopping he is in the same position as one who crosses
the boulevard on the intersecting street. Wilson v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Co., 275 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Terrell v. Fargason, 67 So.2d 771 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1953). A recent case characterized a motorist as turning left when he
was changing from the right to the left lane of a multiple roadway, preparatory
to making a left turn. Mock v. Savage, 123 So.2d 806 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
